PINHOOKING is a business in which the potential for substantial profits comes with considerable risk, which the data can only but best describe as a coin-toss investment.
At auction, the price of a foal or yearling ultimately boils down to three things: the individual, the dam and the sire. The order of importance attached to each, however, is not fixed.
It may well be shared, more or less, by the buyers at any one sale; it is not shared, and this is the point of interest here, across the two sales, where what comes first for a yearling need not come first for a foal.
A yearling is much closer to maturity, and its buyers must, in the end, go on to race what they see in front of them. Where the individual impresses, buyers may well forgive a sire who is not, for the time being, the most popular; where it does not, no sire, however fashionable, is likely to save it.
The foal sale, by contrast, is a little different. A foal is only several months old, and the course its development may take, in one direction or the other, is far more difficult to know.
The foal that takes the eye at the foal sales is not necessarily the yearling that stands out the following autumn, and the reverse is no less true. It could be argued, then, that the foal sale is as much a sale of the sire as it is of the individual, and that the yearling sale, for the reasons given, is rather less so.
Recent stallion success therefore counts for a great deal at the foal sale. If that is the case, and there is good reason to think it is, then this is also where the trouble may begin.
When a stallion has Group 1 winners, his foals become, almost overnight, considerably more sought after, and pinhookers are seldom slow to act.
Using foal and yearling sales from 2022 to 2026, this article analyses the foals bought before and after a stallion’s increase in Group 1 winners. Foal buyers, it argues, are overheating the market for these suddenly fashionable foals, and creating a source of mispricing as a result.
It documents that pinhookers pay around €24,000 more for these foals. Doing so reduces their profit by around €25,000 a foal, and takes the median foal from a gain of €16,500 to a loss of €1,100.
Gains and losses
The dataset covers 10 major yearling and five main foal sales in Europe, with 5,319 foal records linked to their later yearling outcomes. Of these, 4,195 have recorded trading outcomes.
Returns are expressed in euros, with a standard €10,000 allowance deducted for keeping and trading costs.
Figure 1 shows the average gain among profitable trades, the average loss among unprofitable ones, and the overall median result, grouped by the original foal purchase price.
The first thing to notice is how quickly the sums involved increase with the original purchase price. For foals bought for over €100,000, the average gain among the winners is about €160,100, while the average loss is €42,900.
This notwithstanding, the median result across all 495 foals in this bracket is only €26,205. In other words, although the successful purchases can generate considerable profits, they are not necessarily representative of what the average buyer might expect from any one foal.
ONE way to examine whether pinhookers are paying too much for certain foals is to look at how the two sets of buyers respond to good news about a stallion’s recent racing success. To do this, I use what economists call a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach.
Suppose we want to know the effect on foal and yearling prices - and therefore pinhooking profits - of a stallion experiencing an increase in the number of Group 1 winners in one season compared to the previous. We first need to compare the prices paid for his foals before and after the improvement.
But foal prices might have changed anyway, so we also need to take away the change over the same period among stallions without a Group 1 winner. The difference gives us an estimate of how much more buyers paid for foals by these sires following the increase. We then make exactly the same comparison when those foals are resold as yearlings; and the difference between the two is the DiD effect that the increase in Group 1 winners had on pinhooking profits.
To paint a picture, both of the method under consideration, and the underlying pattern the results take, I plot in Figure 2 the average prices paid for foals and yearlings by sires before and after they witnessed the increase in Group 1 winners, against those by sires who either had no Group 1 winner or had no more than the season before.
The foals of these stallions averaged approximately €93,000 and €83,000 in the two years before it, rising to about €107,000 at the foal sales which followed it.
Over the same period, foals by the comparison stallions fell from around €26,000 to €24,000. Had the first group simply followed this wider trend, their average price would have been approximately €81,000, shown by the dashed line. The difference of roughly €26,000 is therefore the additional amount paid for the foals following the increase.
It is the yearlings sold in year 1 that are of most interest here, because these are the ones that were bought as foals at the higher prices due to the increase in the sires’ Group 1 winners. They averaged about €154,000, roughly €7,000 less than the yearlings sold the year before. In other words, the additional €26,000 paid for them as foals was not matched by any rise in what they made as yearlings.
FIGURE 3 reports the ‘difference in difference’ results for each stallion individually.
Its foot shows that foals bought after a stallion’s increase in Group 1 winners averaged a profit of €26,000 when resold as yearlings, €25,000 less than the year before, and the proportion making a gain fell from 60% to 48%.
For the comparison stallions, neither changed by much. Turning to the stallions themselves, the main message is that the extra money went in at the foal sale and did not come back at the yearling sale.
Among the 13 whose increase came in 2024, the average foal price increased for 11, with the group average rising from approximately €89,000 to €134,000. But the same foals went on to average €194,000 as yearlings, almost exactly what the previous cohort had made.
Buyers therefore paid around €45,000 more for a foal that was worth no more as a yearling, and the whole of that difference came out of their profit.
Too Darn Hot is a useful example to illustrate this point. Following Hotazhell’s victory in the Futurity Trophy in October 2024, his average foal price increased from €117,000 to €181,000, while the yearling price increased only from €175,000 to €187,000.
Only nine of the 22 foals bought in 2024 had a profitable recorded outcome, and the average result across all 22 was a loss of €4,600, compared with a profit of €48,000 for the cohort before.
There are numerous other such cases in Figure 3 which the reader can mull over for themselves, Night Of Thunder, Kingman, Lope De Vega and Starman among them.
Of course, this does not happen every time. No Nay Never’s average foal price increased from €118,000 to €216,000 in 2025, and the three later sold as yearlings averaged more than €500,000. But these are a handful of foals at the very top of the market. Across the 29 cases in Figure 3, average profit fell in 21.
The difficulty for the buyer is that there is no knowing beforehand which kind is being bought, and on this evidence the odds were against them.
ALTHOUGH the returns to pinhooking depend very much on the price paid for a foal, which itself reflects information beyond the reach of the analyst, the data nevertheless allow us to identify certain patterns which do not so readily go away.
The results suggest that pinhookers are paying too much for foals of certain parentage. This is not to say that the progeny of successful stallions are wrongfully sought after. The difficulty that arises is in how much buyers ultimately come to pay for them.
When a stallion begins siring Group 1 winners, a collective movement towards his offspring is entirely understandable. By the time buyers arrive at the foal sales, they know both what the stallion has achieved on the racecourse and what his yearlings made only months earlier.
The latter may naturally serve as a benchmark for their own purchasing decisions. But this benchmark is available to everyone, and the competition which follows can bear along prices well beyond what the yearling market a year later is prepared to reward.
It might be said that despite this shrinkage there are still profits to be made. My response to that would be two-fold.
Firstly, anyone spending over €100,000 on a foal is not doing so in the hope of a modest return. The attraction is the kind of profit shown in Figure 1, where successful purchases averaged more than €160,000. Of these though, four in 10 made a loss, and only one in three made more than €100,000.
Secondly, foals bought following a stallion’s Group 1 success cost around €89,000 on average, about €24,000 more than the year before, and fewer than half of them, 143 of 298, made a gain. A year earlier, 60% of the same stallions’ foals had done so.
As the foot of Figure 3 shows, their average profit halved, from about €51,000 to €26,000, and the median foal went from a gain of €16,500 to a loss of €1,100.
Competition for the foals of the stallion of the moment can explain the high prices paid at the foal sales and the poor returns which follow. The central message is that chasing a stallion’s Group 1 success is hazardous to the pinhooker’s wealth, and that avoiding the crowd is perhaps the wisest course of action.
Conor Banahan joined the Economic and Social Research Institute in Ireland as a researcher in September 2024 until August 2026. He holds a BSc in Business Studies from DCU and an MSc in Economics from Trinity College Dublin. He is currently doing a PhD in Economics at UCD. His research focuses on applied microeconomics, including labour markets, housing, energy pricing, and auction markets.